This paper investigates the quarter-ahead predictability of Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey credit spreads for short and long maturity bonds during two separate periods preceding and following the Lehman Brothers' default. A model based on the current country-specic credit spread curve predicts no better than the random walk and slope regression benchmarks. Extensions with the global yield curve factors and short-term interest rate volatility notably outperform the benchmark models post-Lehman. Our ndings suggest that uncertainty indicators, both global and domestic, contain information about future credit spreads and that bond prices did better align with fundamentals post-crisis.
Introduction
Little is known about the predictability of sovereign credit spreads in markets where investors are non-trivially exposed to default risk. Beyond academia, lling this vacuum is important for several reasons. Being able to generate accurate out-of-sample (or real-time) predictions of emerging sovereign credit spreads at various maturities is essential for pricing emerging market assets and derivatives, and for international portfolio management. Furthermore, This paper contributes to the nascent literature on sovereign bond yield predictability with a comprehensive in-and out-of-sample forecasting analysis for four relatively mature 1 emerging markets: Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey. The goal is to test three novel hypotheses that stem from extant nancial economic theory and evidence. The rst hypothesis states that the current emerging-market credit spread curve alone is a sucient statistic to predict future credit spreads (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis is motivated by the rational expectations theory of interest rates that has been widely scrutinized in the riskless debt context. The main idea is that, since the credit spread curve embeds forward credit spreads, it contains market expectations about future credit spreads.
1 Likewise, popular ane termstructure models of riskless debt imply that all the necessary information to predict credit spreads is impounded in the current credit spread curve. In order to test Hypothesis 1, we specify a parsimonious (baseline) predictive model for future credit spreads that exploits the information content of the credit spread curve alone; that is, the only predictors are the current spread level, slope and curvature factors.
The second hypothesis is that indicators of uncertainty about global business conditions and about the emerging borrower's future ability to repay debt convey additional information about the future credit spread over and above the current credit spread curve (Hypothesis 2). To formally test this hypothesis, we deploy a hierarchical predictive regression approach by which the baseline emerging-market credit spread curve model is gradually extended with various predictors. Aligned with the rst part of the hypothesis, we consider as key global macroeconomic indicators the U.S. interest rate curve factors that reect expectations about future global riskless rates and, more pertinently, the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate that reects uncertainty therein. The established wisdom is that, on the one hand, global interest rates inuence the country-specic default component of the credit spread.
Specically, the U.S. interest rate inuences domestic business conditions it explains about 1 Akin to the one-to-one relationship that exists between yields on pure discount bonds and current forward interest rates for riskless bonds, credit spreads on defaultable bonds are linked to current forward spreads. 20% of output variability in emerging markets (Uribe and Yue, 2006) by determining the borrowing costs faced by the sovereign. Through its signaling role about the global nancial market conditions, on the other hand, the U.S. interest rate impacts on common factors such as global market liquidity and investors' risk appetite and hence, it inuences also the nondefault-related risk premium component of the credit spread (Hartelius et al., 2008; Longsta et al., 2011) . The volatility of the U.S. interest rate is therefore a natural candidate predictor of uncertainty about both components of the emerging-market sovereign credit spread.
Next, as predictors to test Hypothesis 2 are two emerging economy's external sector indicators: trade balance and terms of trade growth. Noting that our conjecture concerns specically the uncertainty about the emerging economy's ability to generate funds in hard currencies for debt repayment, we assess the signaling ability of the volatility of trade balance and terms of trade growth while controlling for the information content in their levels. The motivation for this aspect of Hypothesis 2 stems from open-economy theory. The savingsunder-uncertainty neoclassical model of Mendoza (1997) states that the variability of the terms of trade growth aects output growth (positively or negatively depending on the level of risk aversion) and reduces social welfare. The real business cycle model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) establishes that the variability of net exports is associated with productivity trend growth shocks. In particular, trend growth shocks have been empirically linked to the frequency of defaults in emerging markets (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006) .
Third, we conjecture that emerging market sovereign bond spreads became more aligned with global/domestic fundamentals post-Lehman (Hypothesis 3). This conjecture is inspired by the notion of wake-up calls or learning eects in nancial markets as originally put forward by Goldstein et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2011) . A theoretical framework for wake-up calls is recently oered by Ahnert and Bertsch (2015) using global coordination games. Their model predicts that in calm market conditions investors may not have sucient incentives to acquire costly information about a market; consequently, this may induce some divergence of the market prices from fundamentals. However, a crisis event in another market induces investors to acquire information about the rst market and re-assess its fundamentals even if investors learn that the two markets are unrelated to each other. Inspired by this theory, we conjecture that the collapse of Lehman Brothers served as a wake-up call for emerging-market sovereign bond investors, urging them to pay closer attention to the global and domestic fundamentals that inuence the sovereign's ability to repay debt.
Using cross-sections of individual bond prices per sovereign borrower sampled at the weekly frequency from July 1, 2003 to December 31, 2013, we begin our analysis by estimating the latent factors of the spread curveà la Nelson and Siegel (1987) . Given the limited crosssection of bonds available, the relative parsimony of this approach is important to preserve degrees of freedom in estimation and achieve as much accuracy as possible in the factor extraction. For the same reason, we focus on four sovereigns with relatively large and liquid markets for U.S. dollar denominated bonds spanning the typical maturity spectrum: Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey.
2 We make formal inferences using both in-sample and outof-sample (OOS) predictive ability tests. The horizon for the OOS forecasts is one quarter ahead (in the context of our weekly data, h = 13 weeks).
We nd pervasive evidence that the emerging-market credit spread curve is not a sucient statistic for predicting the quarter-ahead spread, against Hypothesis 1, as the baseline model forecasts are no better than those from the random walk and credit-slope benchmarks.
Adding the global riskless yield curve information reduces signicantly the model's in-and out-of-sample predictive errors. The spread curve factors and the global riskless yield curve 2 The cross-sections of bond prices available for other emerging markets that we could have included in the analysis are notably smaller, particularly, in the early years of the sample period. factors together constitute a superior predictive model that is able to beat the benchmarks.
Both in-and out-of-sample tests indicate that the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate, the volatility of the emerging-market sovereign trade balance and terms-of-trade growth are useful predictors of the quarter-ahead emerging market spread, in line with Hypothesis 2. These results provide insights that may help in rening extant structural and reducedform models of emerging-market sovereign debt (Gibson and Sundaresan, 2005; Due et al., 2003; Pan and Singleton, 2008) . Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3 about the wakeup call eect of the Lehman Brothers' collapse on emerging-market debt markets, we nd superior in-and out-of-sample predictive ability of most global and domestic macroeconomic indicators after this negative event. We interpret this nding as evidence that credit spreads became closer aligned with fundamentals post-Lehman. Related Literature. Our paper relates to a very sparse literature on the OOS predictability of emerging-market sovereign credit spreads. To our knowledge, there are only two studies in this spirit broadly speaking. Sueppel (2005) predicts the cointegration path of the spread on the Merril Lynch Emerging Market Bond index. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) construct a hazard model for forecasting the sovereign's default probability using the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global index; 3 they utilize the default probability forecasts to construct hazard-model-implied spreads. Our paper distinguishes itself from these two studies in various aspects. First, the target variable is dierent. We seek to predict an observable variable, the sovereign credit spread, at a relatively short (quarter ahead) horizon whereas Sueppel (2005) is interested instead in the latent long-run equilibrium path of the spread. Unlike Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) that focus on the default component of the 3 Focusing on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index as debt portfolio, Comelli (2012) estimates a model of emerging-market sovereign credit spreads based on credit risk ratings and global factors such as the VIX volatility index, and U.S. interest rates, but they do not assess the OOS predictability of spreads. spread, we aim to predict the entire spread that comprises a default risk related component and a non-default related risk premium; the latter is sizeable and non-negligible (see, e.g., Longsta et al., 2011) . Second, our predictability analysis is based on disaggregated data for bonds of short and long maturities instead of relying on an index (that pools bonds of dierent maturities) as proxy for a country's debt portfolio. Finally, these two predictive studies are not concerned with the term structure; namely, they do not analyze the OOS predictive content of the sovereign credit spread curve or the global riskless yield curve.
Our paper builds on contributions in the riskless bond yield predictability literature. Diebold and Li (2006) , Diebold et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2011) show that the interest rate curve conveys information about future interest rates. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) , Moench (2008) , and Ludvigson and Ng (2009) show that U.S. macroeconomic indicators carry additional information content for future U.S. Treasury bond yields. There is a vacuum of knowledge on these issues, however, in the context of risky debt. The one extant contribution is Khrishnan et al. (2010) but their focus is instead the corporate bond market. They provide evidence that the credit spread curve is not a sucient statistic to predict future corporate credit spreads since the riskless yield curve adds signicant predictive accuracy.
Our paper is evidently related to the literature that investigates the drivers of emergingmarket sovereign credit spreads. The established wisdom is that both global factors (e.g., Uribe and Yue, 2006; Hartelius et al., 2008; Longsta et al., 2011) and domestic macroeconomic indicators (e.g., Edwards, 1986; Min, 1998; Ferrucci, 2003; Baldacci et al., 2008 ) play a role. However, a common feature of these papers is that they do not analyze the OOS predictive ability of the drivers. This is an important extension of our paper because good in-sample model t and signicance from standard tests is not tantamount to useful OOS predictive ability. The intuition is that typical model estimation approaches using all avail-6 able sample data are, by construction, avoiding large in-sample prediction errors and thus susceptible to over-tting (mistaking noise for signal in the data). An OOS forecasting analysis of this nature is not only relevant for investors but it can also inform the development of theoretical models of emerging-market sovereign debt.
Finally, our paper speaks to a still sparse literature that has adduced evidence of wakeup calls in bond markets. In the context of Eurozone sovereign debt markets, Caceres et al.
(2010), Mink and Haan (2013) and Saka et al. (2015) show that, while early in the crisis the spreads largely reected changes in global risk aversion, at a later stage domestic macroeconomic fundamentals began to matter more; the stronger role played by the fundamentals is observed not only for Eurozone countries severely aected by the crisis but also for other countries in the region. Our paper distinguishes itself from these studies not only in its focus on emerging-market sovereign bond markets but also in that we shed light on the wake-up call notion from the dierent lens of OOS predictability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the predictive models while Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Methodology

2.1
Emerging market zero-coupon credit spreads
The time t price of a zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at t + τ obeys the relation
7 where i denotes the sovereign bond issuer, and y i,t (τ ) is the yield to maturity τ . The target variable in our predictability analysis is the emerging market zero-coupon bond yield spread
where y f,t (τ ) is the time t yield on a U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond. We extract at the weekly frequency the unsmoothed yields on zero-coupon riskless bonds by applying the Fama and Bliss (1987) methodology to cross-sections of market prices of U.S. Treasuries.
4 The unsmoothed Fama-Bliss yields price U.S. Treasuries exactly (see Diebold and Li, 2006 Svensson, 1994) .
With these zero-coupon riskless bond yields in hand, we can construct the corresponding emerging-market credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds, denoted s i,t (τ ), as follows.
We adopt the parsimonious Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition for the spread on the (zero-coupon) maturity τ bond of the emerging-market sovereign i
where t = 1, 2, ..., T are sample weeks, β i0,t , β i1,t and β i2,t are the level, slope and curvature factors, respectively. We extract these latent factors at the weekly frequency by NLS minimization of the distance between the cross-section of observed coupon-paying emerging market bond prices and the corresponding tted bond prices from eqs. (1)-(3) with exponen-4 We thank Robert Bliss for sharing his software and data les. 8 tial decay parameter xed at λ i,t = 0.7308 (annualized yields), as in Diebold and Li (2006) .
Then with the weekly spread factors in hand,β i0,t ,β i1,t ,β i2,t , t = 1, ..., T , we can construct weekly zero-coupon emerging market bond spreads for any maturity, s i,t (τ ), using eq. (3).
Hierarchical predictive regressions
Following Diebold and Li (2006) and Khrishnan et al. (2010) in the riskless debt and risky corporate debt contexts, respectively, we construct baseline forecasts for the h-week-ahead spread as forward projections of the current spread curve using the predictive equation
The parameters α i and γ ij , j = 0, 1, 2, are estimated by OLS using the weekly time-series of emerging market spreads and spread curve factors.
5 In a hierarchical regression approach, we gradually add global macroeconomic factors, G t , and formulate the predictive model
and emerging-market specic macroeconomic factors, EM i,t , leading to the predictive model
The predictive horizon is one-quarter-ahead (h = 13 weeks). We discuss the candidates for global predictors, G t , and domestic predictors, EM i,t , in the next section.
5 Diebold and Li (2006) employ instead a two-step forecasting method by, rst, tting autoregressive models (by OLS) to the estimated weekly factors to capture persistence, and then using the corresponding projections,β ij,t+h = f (β ij,t ), j = 0, 1, 2 as predictive variables in eq. (4).
For the in-sample predictability analysis, equations (4)-(6) are estimated using the entire sample (T weeks). For the OOS predictability analysis, we split the latter into an estimation period (T 0 = 2/3T weeks) and a holdout or evaluation period (T 1 = 1/3T weeks). The sequence of OOS forecasts is obtained by recursive estimation. The rst estimation window spans week t = 1 up to week t = T 0 and enables a rst h-week-ahead forecastŝ i,t+h|t (τ ). The next window, spanning weeks t = 1 to t = T 0 + 1, enables a second forecast and so forth.
2.3
Evaluation of in-and out-of-sample predictive ability
We gauge the in-sample predictability gains in the hierarchical regression analysis through the adjusted coecient of determination R 2 . A Wald test for block-exclusion restrictions is conducted to assess the signicance of any predictability gain; the null hypothesis is H 0 : ∆AdjR 2 = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is H A : ∆AdjR 2 > 0.
We utilize the mean square error (MSE) statistic, which captures the expected value of the squared error loss or quadratic loss, to measure the quality of the quarter-ahead OOS forecastsŝ i,t (τ ). Signicance will be assessed through the Clark and West (2007) A second set of OOS predictability tests is aimed at benchmarking. The idea is to assess 10 whether our predictive regressions, eqs. (4)-(6), are able to beat those models employed as benchmarks in the literature. Given the stylized persistence of credit spreads, a widely-used benchmark is the random walk (RW) model s RW i,t+h|t (τ ) = s i,t (τ ) + ε i,t+h . Another natural benchmark (inspired from the riskless bond predictability literature) is a time-series OLS regression of credit spread changes on credit spread slopes,
(2) denotes the 2-year credit spread. This simple slope regression follows the spirit of the forward-rate regressions of Fama and Bliss (1987) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) , and the term spread regression of Campbell and Shiller (1991) , that have been deployed as alternative tests of the rational expectations theory in the context of riskless interest rates.
6 . Since this benchmarking involves comparing non-nested models, we employ the Diebold and Mariano (1995) In order to collect emerging market bond prices, we establish various eligibility criteria geared towards achieving reliable term-structure estimation. The rst requirement is the availability in each sample week of market price data on at least six Eurobond issues across a range of bond maturities (from 1 to 32 years). The minimum amount at issue is $500 million to mitigate illiquidity. Since relatively few emerging market Eurobonds with maturity below 3 years or above 20 years are observed on a trading day, to mitigate illiquidity also the analysis is conned to 3-20 year maturities. The pool of eligible sovereign bonds per country is further ltered to retain only plain vanilla bond issues, with xed regular coupon payments and without collateral, sink funds or other special contractual aspects.
8
Thus we end up with histories of midweek bid-ask average price quotes for U.S. dollar denominated Eurobonds of four emerging market sovereigns Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey. The primarily data source is Bloomberg. We use Datastream as supplementary data source to fulll our requirement of at least six market bond prices observed on any given week; 19% of our emerging-market sovereign bond prices come from Datastream. The week-by-week spread curve tting described in Section 2.1 is thus based on cross-sections of between 9 and 21 (6 and 17) bond prices for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey (Philippines).
The empirical distribution of the bond pricing error (observed bond price minus tted bond price for a $100 bond) pooled across maturities and weeks has a mean value of less 8 CDS contracts would be a convenient alternative to obviate the extraction of zero-coupon bond yields. But CDS markets are still relatively illiquid at both short and long maturities for the sovereigns of interest here. Ammer and Cai (2007) provide empirical evidence that the relative liquidity of the two markets is a key determinant of where price discovery occurs and document that bond spreads lead CDS premiums for many emerging sovereign borrowers. CDS contracts include various conditions too and it has been shown, for instance, that the cheapest-to-deliver option aects the CDS spread (Ammer and Cai, 2007) . Pan and Singleton (2008) emphasize the liquidity of the underlying bond market as a key determinant of the CDS market liquidity because traders hedge their CDS positions with cash market instruments; a relatively less liquid cash market leads to high hedging costs and, consequently, high bid/ask spreads in the CDS market. than 2 cents for U.S. Treasuries and between 6 and 13 cents for emerging market bonds.
The dispersion of the distribution, given by the standard deviation, is 30 cents for the U.S. market, and between 65 and 130 cents for emerging markets. These pricing errors compare well with those reported in similar studies of speculative and low investment-grade bonds such as Elton et al. (2001) and Khrishnan et al. (2010) . Figure 1 shows the emerging-market spread curves from 3-to 20-year maturity obtained week by week. To preserve space, hereafter the discussion is conned to a short (5-year) maturity and a long (15-year) maturity. 9 Various stylized facts are conrmed by the summary statistics for the weekly credit spreads and spread curve factors given in Table 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
[Insert Table 1 around The credit spread curves are mainly upward-sloping. The slope somewhat declines post-Lehman reecting the start of a global recovery. Consistent with a slow improvement in global fundamentals and relatively stable country-specic economic conditions, the time variation in the credit curve level and slope, captured by the standard deviation of the estimated β 0,t and β 1,t , also lessens post-Lehman (Table 1 ). The rst-order autocorrelation coecient of the credit spreads conrms the stylized persistence of credit spreads. 10 9 We analyzed the predictability of emerging market sovereign spreads for 3, 10, and 20-year maturity bonds also, and the ndings are broadly aligned with those discussed here; details are available upon request. 10 Credit spreads are theoretically conceptualized as realizations from persistent but stationary processes. 
Global macroeconomic predictors
Our hierarchical regression approach starts by constructing quarter-ahead spread predictions from the credit spread curve model (4). Then we test the in-and out-of-sample predictability gains, and relative benchmarking ability by augmenting it with various other predictors.
Among the global macroeconomic indicators, the rst natural candidates are the level, slope, and curvature factors (β f 0,t ,β f 1,t , β f 2,t ) that jointly summarize the information content of the global riskless yield curve.
11 The motivation is twofold. First, through its impact on domestic business conditions, the global interest rate inuences the emerging economy's future ability to repay external debt. The current global riskless yield curve is thus likely to convey information about the future default-risk related component of the emerging market sovereign spread.
12 Empirically, it has been shown that U.S. interest rate shocks are responsible for about 20% of uctuations in an emerging economy's aggregate activity, and the transmission mechanism occurs mainly through the country's credit spread that determines 11 Following Diebold and Li (2006) , we t the Nelson and Siegel (1987) decomposition to the unsmoothed Fama-Bliss yields on zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds to obtain the three latent factors. 12 In the neoclassical growth model of Uribe and Yue (2006) , a positive U.S. interest rate shock contracts the emerging economy's output and investment. The small open economy model of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) contends that shocks to the U.S. interest rate inuence emerging-market business conditions. The structural sovereign debt model of Gibson and Sundaresan (2005) predicts a counter-cyclical relationship between the global business cycle, which is signaled by the global interest rate, and the credit spread. the borrowing cost that the country faces in international markets (Uribe and Yue, 2006) . Second, the global interest rate inuences global liquidity conditions and investors' risk appetite. These, in turn, aect the demand for emerging-market bonds, and other asset classes, versus riskless bonds and therefore the (non-default) emerging market risk premium component of the spread (Hartelius et al., 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009; Longsta et al., 2011) . In other words, the U.S. Treasury bond yield reects the monetary policy path of the Federal Reserve which inuences the capital re-allocation among asset classes globally and the net capital ows to emerging markets. For instance, expansionary U.S. monetary policy together with a decrease in investors' risk aversion can fuel the search for yield which leads to surges in the global demand for emerging market bonds and lower spreads; tighter monetary conditions in major economies and a drying up of global liquidity can reverse the capital ows and increase the spreads (Hartelius et al., 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009) . It has been shown empirically that the U.S. Treasury yield curve contains predictive information for future U.S. Treasury bond yields and for risky corporate credit spreads Li, 2006 and Khrishnan et al., 2010, respectively.) Our next candidate predictor is the U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, denoted σ short f,t and measured at the weekly frequency (on each week t = 1, 2..., T of the sample period) as the standard deviation of the daily 1-year U.S. Treasury bond yield over the most recent 10-day trading window. Greater uncertainty about the monetary policy of major economies (global business conditions) as signaled by higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility, poses a challenge for international investors regarding nancial risk allocation decisions (e.g., Hartelius et al., 2008; Arora and Cerisola, 2001) . Higher U.S. short-term interest rate volatility also implies greater uncertainty about global liquidity which is likely to widen the emerging market spread. Figure A1 
13
The global factors are added to the baseline model in a two-step hierarchical fashion leading to the following formulations of equation (5): model G1 with the global predictors and Gopinath, 2007; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005) .
In the real business cycle model for an emerging economy of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), trend shocks to productivity growth are the key driver of economic growth, and the volatility 13 By contrast, pre-Lehman the correlations between the country spreads and 13-week-lagged volatility of the riskless short-term interest rate are much lower, ranging across countries between -0.32 and -0.13 (-0.22 and -0.05) for the 5-(15-) year bonds. of trade balance is informative about the relative weight of trend versus temporary shocks. This aligns well with the nding that trend shocks to productivity growth can quantitatively match the frequency of defaults in emerging economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006) . Accordingly, we assess the in-and out-of-sample predictive ability (for the quarter-ahead spread) of the trade balance, denoted T B i,t , which represents the month t exports minus im- It is also known that terms-of-trade shocks aect economic activity mainly through uctuations in the price of energy and other commodities. In the context of emerging economies, the eect is amplied by specialization in commodity exports, dependence on imported capital goods, and limited access to global nancial markets (Chen and Rogo, 2003; Mendoza, 1995; Sachs, 1981; IMF, 1991) . Previous research has linked current terms-of trade-growth and future sovereign default risk (Bulow and Rogo, 1989; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) .
The savings-under-uncertainty neoclassical model of Mendoza (1997) formalizes the positive link between terms-of-trade changes and economic growth, and indicates that high termsof-trade growth variability can impair economic growth and reduce social welfare. Extant empirical research has shown that not only the terms-of-trade growth but also its volatility are signicant determinant of future emerging market sovereign default risk (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) . These considerations motivate us to examine the in-and out-of-sample forecasting ability of terms-of-trade growth (∆T T i,t ) and volatility of terms-of-trade growth 14 These indicators and the resulting CR ought to be quickly impounded into bond prices (and spreads) as they are closely monitored by investors and therefore, they may not convey information for the future spread. Nevertheless, given the prominence of the CR in the empirical emerging-market debt modeling literature, all our predictive equations with emerging-market external sector variables include also the CR as control variable.
Accordingly, we begin by adding the emerging-market country rating to the model at hand, G1, and formulate model GEM 1 . Then we add the trade balance to obtain GEM 2 , 14 The foreign debt related indicators behind the CR have been shown to maintain a contemporaneous relationship with credit spreads in Min (1998) and Eichengreen and Mody (1998) inter alia. The CRs are measured in a 050 scale and updated monthly. The detailed CR construction is described in Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013) and http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg. the volatility of trade balance to obtain GEM 3 . Finally, model GEM 4 adds terms-of-trade growth, and GEM 5 adds the volatility of terms-of-trade growth. Summary statistics for these emerging-market external sector variables and country rating are provided in Table 1 . The full list of predictive models built in this hierarchical fashion is shown in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 around here] 4 Empirical results
4.1
Within-sample predictive ability
The baseline credit spread factor model and the two successive extensions with global factors, models G1 and G2, are compared in Table 3 on the basis of their in-sample predictive power.
[Insert Table 3 around 15 This nding represents evidence against Hypothesis 1 that the credit spread curve is a sucient statistic to predict the future spread. Adding the volatility of the U.S. short-term interest rate enhances the average in-sample predictive 15 The Wald tests are based on the standard asymptotic (chi-square) distribution. Hence, they do not account for regressor uncertainty or the fact that the level, slope and curvature factors are estimated. We measured the correlation between the weekly RMSEs of the cross-section tted Nelson-Siegel equation (3) and the weekly residuals of the time-series regression equation (4). The value is small at 0.089 on average across countries, sub-periods and maturities which indirectly suggests that the test distortions are trivial. ability (∆AdjR 2 G2 ≡ AdjR 2 G2 − AdjR 2 G1 ) by 2.4pp and 2.7pp, respectively. However, in contrast with the U.S. yield curve factors, a notable contrast pre-and post-Lehman is observed regarding the additional predictive ability aorded by the volatility of the U.S. interest rate;
∆Adj.R 2 G2 reaches only 1.3pp and 0.8pp pre-Lehman but 3.4pp and 4.6pp post-Lehman for the 5-and 15-year bonds, respectively. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3 on the wakeupeect of the Lehman Brother's bankruptcy.
Next we assess the in-sample predictability gains aorded by domestic macroeconomic variables (∆AdjR 2 GEM j ) and their signicance (Wald test). Table 4 reports the results.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
At both the short-and long-end of the bond maturity spectrum, the country-specic ex- Country rating is the exceptional predictor whose role decreases post-Lehman on average across countries and bond maturities (∆R 2 GEM 1 ≡ AdjR 2 GEM 1 − AdjR 2 G2 < 0). At country level, this nding is most prominent in Brazil, Mexico and Philippines, and absent in the relatively small Turkish bond market. What is the intuition? First, the CR has predictive content for the quarter-ahead credit spread in the pre-Lehman period which indicates that the CR information is not quickly impounded into bond prices. Second, the quarter-ahead predictive content in the CR vanishes post-Lehman, an indirect reection of a dramatic change in the emerging-market bond price discovery process which becomes then more ecient; this 20 evidence is also consistent with Hypothesis 3. Table A1 in the on-line Addendum reports the OLS estimation results for the baseline model and selected (to preserve space) extensions thereof obtained hierarchically by adding global/domestic macroeconomic predictors.
Out-of-sample predictive ability
Since in-sample predictive ability does not necessarily translate into out-of-sample (OOS) or real-time predictive ability, the next important task is to assess the latter. In the pre- Global macroeconomic indicators. The information content in the global riskless yield curve enhances the OOS predictive ability as borne out by the small root mean square error ratio of model G1 relative to the baseline model (i.e., RM SE G1 /RM SE base < 1) reported in Table 5 . This nding reinforces the in-sample predictive evidence against Hypothesis 1.
On average across countries, the reduction in forecast errors aorded by the global riskless yield curve (1 − RM SE G1 /RM SE base ) is 1.2% and 2.9% pre-Lehman and a remarkably larger 12.1% and 11.5% post-Lehman for the 5-and 15-year bonds, respectively. The one exception is Brazil pre-Lehman where augmenting the model with the riskless yield curve factors adds noise to the predictions (RM SE G1 /RM SE base > 1). To explain this contrasting nding, we also notice a distinct sharp fall in the Brazilian credit spreads pre-Lehman.
Helped by favorable global market conditions and investors' search for yield, the dramatic improvement in Brazil's credit rating from B in 2003 to BBB in 2008 may have resulted in over-condent investor sentiment towards Brazil that somewhat decoupled its spreads from the levels consistent with the global interest rate.
[Insert Table 5 around Next we benchmark the baseline predictive model and its extensions with global macroeconomic indicators (models G1 and G2) against the random walk and slope-regression. The results are set up in Table 6 . Reported RMSE ratios below unity indicate that the candidate model gives more accurate forecasts than the benchmark. Signicance is assessed with the Diebold and Mariano (1995) two-sided t-test statistic for non-nested models. A signicant and positive DM statistic indicates that the candidate model outperforms the benchmark.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The baseline model (4) interest rate is added to the predictors set that for all countries and bond maturities the 22 resulting model G2 beats both benchmarks post-Lehman. In the pre-Lehman period, in sharp contrast, models G1 and G2 generally fail to outperform both benchmarks. These ndings altogether represent further evidence against Hypothesis 1 about the informativeness of the credit spread curve alone, but provide support for the wake-up call Hypothesis 3.
As a robustness check, we reformulated the predictive regressions substituting the rst three Principal Components (PCs) of the credit spreads and the U.S. Treasury yields, respectively, for the level, slope and curvature of the country credit spread curve and the global riskless yield curve.
16 The resulting RMSE ratios and signicance statistics do not challenge the above ndings, and are not reported to preserve space (available upon request).
Domestic macroeconomic indicators. Our nal task is to elucidate the marginal OOS predictive ability of the country rating and external sector variables. In the spirit of our hierarchical regression approach, we confront model GEM 1 with the prior (nested) model G2, model GEM 2 with GEM 1, and so forth. Table 7 reports the results.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Consistent with the in-sample predictability ndings, the country rating stands in contrast with the external sector variables due to its weaker OOS predictive power post-Lehman.
The error reduction (1−RM SE GEM 1 /RM SE G2 ) is 5.0% and 6.2% pre-Lehman versus -3.8% and 1.3% post-Lehman on average across countries for the 5-and 15-year bonds, respectively. 17 Smaller bond market size is generally associated with higher market frictions such as the cost of trading due to lower trading volumes and lesser liquidity, and also with higher information costs. These sovereign bond market frictions may hinder predictability by obscuring the nexus between the current credit spread and past country's macroeconomic fundamentals.
The level of trade balance and terms-of-trade growth exhibit also less predictive ability prethan post-Lehman, consistent with Hypothesis 3. However, their overall predictive ability is less remarkable than that of the volatility of trade balance and terms-of-trade growth. The 40.7, $30.3, and $19.2 in 2000 -2003 to $168.9, $119.2, and $53.5 in 2010 for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively (IMF, 2004 , and IMF, 2014 . In contrast, Philippines' new issuance expanded only very moderately from $12.9 to $18.0 billion. Finally, we benchmark the OOS predictions. The results are reported in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 around here] During the pre-Lehman period, the extended models with country rating and external sector variables generally fail to outperform the two benchmarks. In sharp contrast, post-Lehman the same models beat the benchmarks. The only exception is the Mexico 5-year credit spread for which the model forecasts fail to beat the random-walk post-Lehman.
Further investigation suggests that this anomalous result is to a large extent an artefact of the noise introduced by the irrelevant CR variable (which is statistically insignicant according to Wald tests, as shown in the on-line Addendum Table A1 ). The parallel benchmarking results for the extended models with domestic macroeconomic predictors (GEM 2 to GEM 5) but without the CR as control variable are shown in the on-line Addendum Table A2 .
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an entirely new perspective on emerging-market sovereign credit spreads by conducting a comprehensive within-sample and out-of-sample predictability analysis. The investigation is organized around three hypotheses which have implications for policy-makers and bond investors. Hypothesis 1 states that the current spread curve is a sucient statistic to predict future spreads. Building on extant theoretical and empirical contributions, we conjecture that the volatility of global and domestic macroeconomic indicators contains valuable information content about future sovereign credit spreads over and above that conveyed by the current sovereign spread curve (Hypothesis 2). Building on the notion of 18 In line with the in-sample analysis, the OOS predictive ndings are robust to the use of the rst three Principal Components of credit spreads and U.S. bond yields instead of the corresponding Nelson-Siegel level, slope and curvature factors. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. wake-up calls in nancial markets, Hypothesis 3 states that emerging-market sovereign credit spreads became more closely aligned with fundamentals post-Lehman.
To formally test these hypotheses, we estimate dynamic models for Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey with weekly data over two periods surrounding the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. Formal statistical tests of a model's out-of-sample forecast performance are conducted by splitting each of the two periods (pre-and post-Lehman) into an in-sample period, used for the initial parameter estimation, and an out-of-sample period, used to evaluate forecast accuracy. The forecast horizon is one quarter (thirteen weeks) ahead and the out-of-sample forecasts are constructed recursively through expanding estimation windows.
The baseline model that exploits solely the information content in the current credit spread curve is unable to outperform the canonical random walk and slope-regression benchmarks. Successively adding global and country-specic macroeconomic variables produces superior forecasts. This novel nding for emerging market debt refutes Hypothesis 1 and aligns well with extant evidence for riskless debt, questioning the assumptions of ane term-structure models. We conclude that the predictability of future bond yields cannot be completely ascribed to information latent in the cross-section of current yields.
Volatility measures that signal uncertainty either about the global economic outlook or the borrower's future ability to repay debt carry useful information content about future emerging-market credit spreads, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Uncertainty measures therefore should be of concern to policy-makers and market participants. Overall we also see signicantly greater predictive ability of global and country-specic macroeconomic indicators post-Lehman which, consistent with the wake-up call Hypothesis 3, suggests that the pricing of emerging market bonds became then more closely aligned with fundamentals.
The out-of-sample predictability perspective on emerging-market credit spreads adopted in this paper, namely, the construction and evaluation of forecasts over future time periods not used in the model parameter estimation, is relevant for various reasons. Empirical evidence based on out-of-sample and in-sample forecast performance is generally considered more trustworthy than evidence based on in-sample performance alone, which can be more sensitive to outliers and data mining. Out-of-sample forecasts also better reect the information available to the forecaster in real time. Emerging-market spreads, signifying international borrowing costs, inuence domestic business conditions which, in turn, feed into spreads via the default-risk component. A deeper understanding of the real-time predictability of country spreads can help world policy-makers to contain excessive business cycle uctuations in emerging-market sovereigns and assist investors in nancial risk allocation.
Our ndings endorse policies aimed at promoting emerging-market stability by keeping the volatility of U.S. monetary policy low. They also promote policies aimed at sustaining long-term growth in emerging economies by stabilizing their net exports and terms-of-trade growth. Such long-term macroeconomic risk management via institutional and policy change is promoted in Gray and Malone (2008) . Our ndings also endorse the proposition made by Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), Caballero (2003) and Merton (2005) that sovereign borrowers should consider innovative nancial instruments to hedge macroeconomic risk exposures. The target variable is the emerging-market sovereign credit spread on week t+h and the predictive variables are the week t measures outlined in columns. The predictive horizon h is 13 weeks (quarter-ahead prediction). The baseline model is a regression of spreads on spread curve factors, eq. (4). Models G1 and G2 are extensions, eq. (5), obtained by adding the U.S. yield curve factors and the volatility of the US short-term interest rate, respectively. Models GEM1 to GEM5 are extensions, eq. (6) S. short-term interest rate volatility) as predictors. The following rows report the ratio of RMSEs of the model at hand versus the preceding (nested) model. Ratio RMSE < 1 indicates that the additional country-specific predictor in the extended model brings a forecast error reduction versus the preceding nested model. Significance of the error reduction is assessed with the Clark and West (2007; CW) t-test where the null hypothesis is that the predictive ability of the extended model is not superior to that of the preceding nested model; e.g. 0 : 2 ≤ 1 vs. : 2 > 1 for model GEM1 and 0 : 1 ≤ 2 vs. :
1 > 2 for model GEM2. ***, ** and * denote rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. GEM1 adds country rating. GEM2 adds trade balance. GEM3 further adds volatility of trade balance. GEM4 adds terms-of-trade growth. GEM5 adds volatility of terms-of-term growth. Table2 lists all the models. The forecast evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to October 14, 2008 pre-Lehman) and March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 (90 forecasts; post-Lehman) . Models GEM4 and GEM5 are not feasible for Philippines due to data unavailability on terms of trade. Estimation is based on weekly data and forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is = {5, 15} years. Diebold and Mariano (1995) t-test for the hypotheses 0 : ℎ − = 0 vs. : ℎ − ≠ 0. *, ** and *** denotes rejection at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. Estimation is based on weekly data and the forecast horizon is h=13 weeks (quarter ahead). Bond maturity is = {5, 15} years. The forecast evaluation period is November 28, 2006 to October 14, 2008 pre-Lehman) and March 27, 2012 to December 31, 2013 post-Lehman) . See note to Table 7 for a description of the models. 
